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TOO DANGEROUS TO EXIST: HOLDING COMPROMISED INTERNET 
PLATFORMS STRICTLY LIABLE UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF 
ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES 
Jordan Glassman* 
In July 2020, the Twitter accounts of several prominent public 
figures were compromised. The maximally high profile of these 
targets raises the possibility of severe physical, or, more likely, 
economic damages from the fallout of these security failures. 
Because compromises of this type are foreseeable and inevitable in 
the context of software security, and because there is no feasible 
avenue for seeking damages for the resulting purely economic 
losses, a new scheme for relief is needed. This Article proposes 
that the doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous 
activities be applied to internet platforms whose inevitable 
compromises are situated to proximately cause catastrophic 
economic damages. This application of strict liability is measured 
against policy goals, and common-law obstacles to its adoption 
are discussed.  
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The true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings 
on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief 
if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima 
facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of 
its escape. 
– Justice Blackburn, Court of Exchequer Chamber, 1868 in 
Rylands v. Fletcher1  
I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 15, 2020, the Twitter accounts of numerous prominent 
moguls, celebrities, and politicians were compromised, including 
those of Joe Biden, Barack Obama, Bill Gates, Elon Musk, and 
                                                 
 1 Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 339–40. 
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Kim Kardashian, among some 130 others.2 The attackers offered to 
generously double the money of credulous users as part of an 
apparent bitcoin scam.3 
While the compromise was quickly contained and the actual 
monetary damages were minimal, the maximally high profile of 
the targeted individuals immediately prompted speculation on the 
damage a more ambitious malicious actor could have wrought.4 
For example, because world leaders now routinely use Twitter to 
announce or criticize policy decisions, it is easy to envision a 
scenario wherein a forged tweet from the account of the U.S. 
President or the Kremlin could spark major financial market 
movement or even preemptive military action.5 
                                                 
 2 Joe Tidy & David Molloy, Twitter Hack: 130 Accounts Targeted in Attack, BBC 
(July 17, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-53445090 [https://perma.cc/
85WC-CCA3]; see also An Update on Our Security Incident, 
TWITTER (July 30, 2020, 5:45 PM) https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/compan
y/2020/an-update-on-our-security-incident.html [https://perma.cc/8BW9-6GN4]. 
 3 Rishi Iyengar, Twitter Blames ‘coordinated’ Attack on its Systems for Hack of 
Joe Biden, Barack Obama, Bill Gates and Others, CNN (July 16, 2020, 6:38 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/15/tech/twitter-hack-elon-musk-bill-gates/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/G5R7-MMEC]; see also Who’s Behind Wednesday’s Epic 
Twitter Hack?, KREBS ON SEC. (July 16, 2020, 5:41 PM), 
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2020/07/whos-behind-wednesdays-epic-twitter-hack/ 
[https://perma.cc/X5FX-J3D5]. 
 4 Casey Newton, The Massive Twitter Hack Could be a Global Security 
Crisis, VERGE (July 15, 2020, 8:27 PM), https://www.theverge.com/interface/20
20/7/15/21325708/twitter-hack-global-security-crisis-nuclear-war-bitcoin-scam 
[https://perma.cc/HF34-873U]. 
 5 See, e.g., HEATHER WILLIAMS & ALEXI DREW, ESCALATION BY TWEET: 
MANAGING THE NEW NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY 6 (2020), https://www.kcl.ac.uk/cs
ss/assets/10957•twitterconflictreport-15july.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2QP-PU6L]; 
see also Casey Newton, A Catastrophe at Twitter, INTERFACE (July 15, 2020), https:
//www.getrevue.co/profile/caseynewton/issues/a-catastrophe-at-twitter-263960 
[https://perma.cc/8HYA-C4JU] (“After today it is no longer unthinkable, if it ever 
truly was, that someone take over the account of a world leader and attempt to 
start a nuclear war”). Compare Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump [https://perma.cc/L46W-PJS6] (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2020), with President of Russia (@KremlinRussia), TWITTER, 
https://twitter.com/KremlinRussia [https://perma.cc/Y8FE-6XEL] (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2020) (illustrating a particularly sharp and well-publicized contrast). 
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Given that many of the internet platforms6 routinely used by 
powerful public figures lack any statutorily imposed security 
protocols, no consumer-facing internet service can be considered 
secure, much less perfectly so.7 Under these circumstances, to what 
extent do Twitter and similar platforms assume liability for an 
inevitable compromise that results, in the extreme case, in 
catastrophic damages? 
Widely used internet platforms have largely shielded 
themselves from liability through mass-market adhesion contracts, 
at least as against their own users.8 In scenarios like the July 2020 
Twitter hack, however, damages could extend beyond users that 
have agreed to the terms of service and instead affect third-party 
non-users. Historically, it has proven very difficult to hold 
platform providers liable for the actions of individuals committing 
                                                 
 6 The term “internet platform” is used loosely in this work to describe a 
globally and publicly accessible, cloud-based communications tool. “Dangerous 
internet platform” describes ones that should be subject to strict liability. 
 7 See Michael D. Scott, Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has 
the Time Finally Come?, 67 MD. L. REV. 425, 425 (2008) (“History, however, 
suggests otherwise: the software market has failed to produce secure 
software.”); Bruce Schneier, The Twitter Hacks Have to Stop, ATLANTIC (July 
18, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/twitter-hacks-
have-stop/614359/ [https://perma.cc/E8XZ-32EY]. The absence of regulation 
for social media platforms and most other targets for cyber criminals, is in sharp 
contrast with the healthcare and financial sectors, which are subject to 
heavyweight regulation. See, e.g., The Patchwork of Federal Data Protection 
Laws, U.S. SENATE REPUBLICAN POL’Y COMM. (July 24, 2019), 
https://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/the-patchwork-of-federal-data-
protection-laws [https://perma.cc/HFH7-ZLDX]. 
 8 Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement 
of Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1553, 1562–63 (2005). For a typical 
example, see Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php 
[https://perma.cc/PC7W-492U] (last updated Oct. 01, 2020) (“We cannot predict 
when issues might arise with our Products. Accordingly, our liability shall be 
limited to the fullest extent permitted by applicable law, and under no 
circumstance will we be liable to you for any lost profits, revenues, information, 
or data, or consequential, special, indirect, exemplary, punitive, or incidental 
damages.”). 
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torts using the providers’ platforms.9 While calls for modernizing 
the regulatory framework bracketing modern software operations 
become more frequent, the world is nevertheless stuck with the 
threat that these platforms now pose.10 
Therefore, given the magnitude and urgency of the threat, 
certain particularly dangerous internet platforms, like Twitter, 
should be exposed to strict liability for abnormally dangerous 
activities when the platform is compromised and results in 
substantial damages. Much like those unwittingly living inside the 
blast radius of commercial demolitions operations, Americans are 
awash in the wake of global, ubiquitous communications tools. 
When misused by malicious hands, these tools could potentially 
unleash economic or even, in the most extreme cases, physical 
damages due to preemptive military action.11 It is time for courts to 
reign in risks of that magnitude.12  
This Article proposes that dangerous internet platforms should 
be held strictly liable for abnormally dangerous activities when a 
compromise occurs that results in substantial pecuniary loss to 
third-parties. Part II surveys current events which exemplify the 
scope of the dangers that a compromised platform could cause. 
Part III examines the potential avenues for liability in the event of 
such a compromise and highlights that a finding for a plaintiff is 
unlikely under any of the currently available strategies. Part IV 
                                                 
 9 See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 
WASH. L. REV. 335, 339–40 (2005) (“[O]nline service providers enjoy total 
immunity from liability as both distributors and as publishers.”). 
 10 See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad & Elif Kavusturan, A Commercial Law for 
Software Contracting, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 775, 784–786 (2019). 
 11 Schneier, supra note 7; see also Corinne Purtill, Twitter Security Flaws 
Pose a Unique Threat to Nuclear Diplomacy, Experts Say, ONEZERO (July 17, 
2020), https://onezero.medium.com/twitter-security-flaws-pose-a-unique-threat-to-
nuclear-diplomacy-experts-say-b509e0eb2aad [https://perma.cc/3KUD-NF8Z] (“A 
poorly worded tweet at the wrong time from a high-profile yet intemperate 
user . . . could instigate nuclear conflict. A fraudulent tweet sent by a malevolent 
actor determined to cause as much harm as possible could be even worse.”). 
 12 Schneier, supra note 7 (“Underspending on security, and letting society pay 
the eventual price, is far more profitable. I don’t blame the tech companies. 
Their corporate mandate is to make as much money as is legally possible. Fixing 
this requires changes in the law, not changes in the hearts of the company’s 
leaders.”). 
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defines the doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous 
activities and explores modern applications of the doctrine. Finally, 
Part V and the Conclusion propose that courts go beyond the 
proposals previously made in the literature and apply strict liability 
for abnormally dangerous activities to economic damages resulting 
from the malicious use of compromised internet platforms. 
II. THE SCOPE OF DANGER FROM CYBERCRIME 
The internet has become such a normalized part of American 
life for most that raising the specter of catastrophic damages might 
seem hyperbolic. Yet cyberattacks against states and state actors 
are commonplace.13 Moreover, contrary to the impression that the 
widespread use of the technology might suggest, these attacks are a 
normal side effect of all networked software.14 The damages 
resulting from such attacks lie on a spectrum, ranging from trivial 
to seismic.15 
A. The Unceasing Drumbeat of Consequential Cyberattacks 
Cyberattacks against internet-connected services involving 
states and state actors are routine.16 These attacks range from “data 
                                                 
 13 See, e.g., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 2019 INTERNET CRIME REPORT, 
https://pdf.ic3.gov/2019_IC3Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q78A-Q4QF] (last visited 
Oct. 3, 2020) (citing nearly 14,000 instances of “government impersonation” 
internet crimes in the United States in 2019, resulting in losses of more than 124 
million dollars). 
 14 See Andrey Evdokimov, What It Takes to Be a CISO, KASPERSKY 
DAILY (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/ciso-report/24288/ 
[https://perma.cc/QG6Z-Z87L] (surveying Chief Information Security Officers 
and finding that the vast majority assume that breaches are inevitable). 
 15 See, e.g., Robert P. Hartwig, Cyberrisk: Threat and Opportunity, 1, 
14-17 INS. INFO. INST. (Oct. 2016), https://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf
/cyber_risk_wp_102716-92.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3FE-NZ8S] (finding significant 
variation in the per-record damages resulting from data breaches across 
enterprises). 
 16 Significant Cyber Incidents, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUD., 
https://www.csis.org/programs/technology-policy-program/significant-cyber-
incidents [https://perma.cc/AH7Q-W6N7] (last visited Sept. 15, 2020). 
COVID-19 has had an amplifying effect on incidents of cybercrime, causing a 
“significant target shift from individuals and small businesses to major 
corporations, governments and critical infrastructure.” INTERPOL Report 
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theft and ransomware to the overtaking of systems with potentially 
large-scale harmful consequences.”17 The fallout from these attacks 
range widely, but substantial damages are not uncommon.18 
Of the cyberattacks that are constantly in progress,19 some 
small subset of them, when successful, result in substantial 
economic or political consequences. In addition to the July 2020 
Twitter hack, recent examples of various kinds of cyberattacks 
with potentially nationwide ramifications include: (1) the recent 
ransomware attack on the global GPS device and services 
developer Garmin;20 (2) the 2017 Equifax compromise resulting in 
a leak of nearly half of the American population’s private data;21 
(3) the 2016 Mirai botnet attack, which made large portions of the 
internet unavailable for nearly a day for American and European 
                                                                                                             
Shows Alarming Rate of Cyberattacks During COVID-19, INTERPOL, 
https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2020/INTERPOL-report-
shows-alarming-rate-of-cyberattacks-during-COVID-19 [https://perma.cc/JPQ2-
QZ4H] (last visited Sept. 15, 2020). 
 17 Wild Wide Web, WORLD ECON. F., https://reports.weforum.org/global-risks-
report-2020/wild-wide-web/ [https://perma.cc/HMY2-LAH5] (last visited Sept. 
15, 2020). 
 18 See PUBLIC-PRIVATE ANALYTIC EXCH. PROGRAM, GEOPOLITICAL IMPACT 
ON CYBER THREATS FROM NATION-STATE ACTORS 1–2 (2019), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ia/ia_geopolitical-impact-
cyber-threats-nation-state-actors.pdf [https://perma.cc/SAX9-WTSL] (surveying 
notorious incidents affecting multinational corporations, banks, power plants, 
airports, and even Iran’s nuclear power weapons development program); see 
also Madeline A. Labovitz, Your Natural Gas is Not Cyber-Secure, 21 N.C. J. L. 
& TECH. 217, 231 (describing a foreign natural gas pipeline explosion 
equivalent in magnitude to a nuclear weapon caused by malicious code); see 
also infra Section II.C. 
 19 See Cyberthreat Real-time Map, KASPERSKY, https://cybermap.kaspersky.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/H6AC-Y67Y] (last visited Sept. 16, 2020). 
 20 Dan Goodin, Garmin’s Four-Day Service Meltdown Was Caused by 
Ransomware, ARS TECHNICA (July 27, 2020, 4:03 PM), 
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/07/garmans-four-day-
service-meltdown-was-caused-by-ransomware/ [https://perma.cc/Y3WJ-RPYX]. 
 21 Michael Riley et al., The Equifax Hack Has the Hallmarks of State-
Sponsored Pros, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 29, 2017, 1:33 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-09-29/the-equifax-hack-has-
all-the-hallmarks-of-state-sponsored-pros [https://perma.cc/LGC5-CVP4]. 
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users;22 and (4) the notorious leaking of the Democratic National 
Committee’s private emails.23 
B. The Economic and Physical Damages Due to Cyberattacks 
When a popular internet platform is compromised, rather than 
steal data, the attackers can weaponize the platform itself given 
untrammeled access to its facilities.24 After considering the 
consequences of a diplomatic misunderstanding over Twitter, a 
study from King’s College concluded that “social media [use by 
international leaders] has the potential to be a disruptive 
technology and exacerbate tensions during crises.”25 The authors of 
the study conclude that due to the United States’ disproportionately 
extensive use of Twitter relative to other countries, while “tweets 
are unlikely to independently start a crisis . . . [t]here is a risk, 
however, that tweets can enable or accelerate an ongoing crisis.”26 
The King’s College study assumes that the users are all 
legitimate government actors.27 Malicious users masquerading as 
legitimate government actors could cause real-world damages, 
since government actors and other actors whose accounts have 
global reach are demonstrably vulnerable.28 In 2011, the NBC 
                                                 
 22 Elie Bursztein, Inside the Infamous Mirai IoT Botnet: A Retrospective Analysis, 
CLOUDFLARE BLOG (Dec. 14, 2017), https://blog.cloudflare.com/inside-mirai-the-
infamous-iot-botnet-a-retrospective-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/23GA-MDU5]. 
 23 See Jack Goldsmith, What is Old, and New, and Scary in Russia’s Probable 
DNC Hack, LAWFARE (July 25, 2016, 10:39 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
what-old-and-new-and-scary-russias-probable-dnc-hack [https://perma.cc/42KU-
RU6G] (“The Russian hack of the DNC was small beans compared to the 
destruction of the integrity of a national election result.”). 
 24 The bulk of the scholarly legal commentary on so-called cybertorts refers 
most often to data breaches. This work assumes that the potential damages when 
a compromised platform is used to maliciously trade on the identities of 
prominent users, institutions, or states easily transcend those stemming from 
data breaches. 
 25 Williams & Drew, supra note 5, at 5. 
 26 Id. at 18. 
 27 Id. at 6. 
 28 Who’s Behind Wednesday’s Epic Twitter Hack?, HACKER NEWS, 
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=23864265 [https://perma.cc/8H5H-RTS2] 
(last visited Sept. 17, 2020) (illustrating a wide range of discussion on this topic 
from professionals in the software development industry); see also Justin (Gus) 
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News Twitter account was compromised and broadcast two fake 
tweets about a false attack on Ground Zero, the site of the 9/11 
attacks in New York.29 In 2017, a disgruntled contractor working 
for Twitter disabled U.S. President Donald Trump’s account.30 
Twitter’s own CEO, Jack Dorsey, had his personal account 
compromised in 2019.31 Most recently, in September of 2020, the 
Prime Minister of India’s Twitter account was compromised in yet 
another bitcoin scam.32 
The possibility of substantial economic loss following a 
compromise by a malicious user is very real.33 In 2013, the Twitter 
account of the Associated Press was compromised by Syrian 
hackers, resulting in a fake tweet about an explosion in the White 
House.34 The result was a near-instantaneous 143-point plunge in 
the Dow Jones Industrial average.35 While the market recovered 
quickly, unrecoverable market losses are not infeasible.36 
                                                                                                             
Hurwitz, Cyberensuring Security, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1495, 1509 (2017) 
(discussing the range of motivations of attackers, including political or social 
purposes, even including advancing a political agenda). 
 29 Elinor Mills, NBC News Twitter Account Hacked, CNET (Sept. 9, 2011, 
3:33 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/nbc-news-twitter-account-hacked/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q8GQ-AZTD]. 
 30 Mike Isaac & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Twitter’s Panic After Trump’s 
Account is Deleted Caps a Rough Week, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/03/technology/trump-twitter-deleted.html 
[https://perma.cc/TE4Q-SHXB].  
 31 Kate Conger, Twitter C.E.O. Jack Dorsey’s Account Hacked, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/30/technology/jack-dorsey-
twitter-account-hacked.html [https://perma.cc/9TAU-2YCS]. 
 32 Indian Prime Minister Modi Twitter Account Hacked, BBC (Sept. 3, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-54007995 [https://perma.cc/UCT3-A6A6]. 
 33 See Geoffrey Ingersoll, Inside the Clever Hack That Fooled the AP and 
Caused The DOW to Drop 150 Points, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 22, 2013, 4:14 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/inside-the-ingenious-hack-that-fooled-the-ap-
and-caused-the-dow-to-drop-150-points-2013-11 [https://perma.cc/4GES-NLYB]. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Heidi Moore & Dan Roberts, AP Twitter Hack Causes Panic on Wall Street 
and Sends Dow Plunging, GUARDIAN (Apr. 23, 2013, 3:41 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/apr/23/ap-tweet-hack-wall-street-
freefall [https://perma.cc/X62P-WV2L].  
 36 See Shawn Langlois, This Day in History: Hacked AP Tweet About White 
House Explosions Triggers Panic, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 23, 2018, 2:08 PM), 
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Because the possibility of physical damages due to a 
preemptive military response is both outlandish and likely 
transcends what is reachable through a suit in the common law of 
torts, this analysis will focus on the more plausible scenario 
involving sustained or permanent losses in the financial markets: 
purely pecuniary losses.37 Although the actual damages resulting 
from the July 2020 Twitter hack and the events discussed in this 
section fall short of catastrophic, the potential damages do not.38 
Bad actors are constantly looking for new ways to fraudulently 
exploit the market’s response to disinformation.39 
A plausible hypothetical: the Twitter and Facebook accounts of 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office are compromised and used 
to fraudulently announce a change in the length of U.S. patent 
terms from twenty years to seventeen years.40 U.S. markets would 
likely immediately drop in response to such a predictable decline 
in medium-term revenues. The fraud is detected and the market 
recovers, but not before the attacker anonymously short-sells41 
shares of IBM, Intel, and Apple, among the largest American 
                                                                                                             
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-day-in-history-hacked-ap-tweet-about-white-
house-explosions-triggers-panic-2018-04-23 [https://perma.cc/2USM-YNPH]. 
 37 See Hartwig, supra note 15, at 14–17 (surveying the economic risk from the 
standpoint of the insurer). 
 38 Alicia McElhaney, Fake News Creates Real Losses, INSTITUTIONAL INV. (Nov. 
18, 2019), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1j2ttw22xf7n6/Fake-News-
Creates-Real-Losses [https://perma.cc/6S6U-ZWZF] (giving an example of a 341 
billion dollar near-instantaneous market plummet due to an erroneous news 
report and estimating at least 39 billion dollars in annual market losses due to 
“the deliberate creation and sharing of false or manipulated information to harm 
others for personal, political, or financial gain” over the internet). 
 39 See Jennifer DeTrani, Short and Distort: How Companies are ‘Bearing’ 
Down on Market-Shifting Disinformation, ABOVE THE L. (Feb. 6, 2020, 12:47 
PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2020/02/short-and-distort-how-companies-are-bearing-
down-on-market-shifting-disinformation/ [https://perma.cc/4JAR-A5VR]. 
 40 @USPTO, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/uspto [https://perma.cc/4KUU-
5LYB] (last visited Oct. 5, 2020); United States Patent and Trademark Office, 
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/uspto.gov/ [https://perma.cc/GQ46-CHU3] 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2020). 
 41 James Chen, Short Selling, INVESTOPEDIA (last updated Feb. 4, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shortselling.asp [https://perma.cc/Y3HQ-
M7XV]. 
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assignees of thousands of patents.42 Unable to locate the 
cybercriminal or recover from their losses, the affected financial 
institutions may seek financial redress against Twitter and 
Facebook. 
C. The Inevitability of Compromise 
The July 2020 Twitter hack described in the Introduction43 was 
not the work of sophisticated criminal masterminds.44 It was 
instead a fairly typical feat of social engineering, involving a 
deliberate campaign to deceive employees into granting access to 
internal administration systems.45 Social engineering attacks 
exploit predictable tendencies of human beings that must 
inescapably be involved with the maintenance and operation of 
internet platforms.46 
Beyond the vulnerability of human beings, perfectly secure 
software is a fantasy.47 All software is susceptible to attack and, if 
networked, potentially exploitable by any connected person in the 
world.48 While platform providers might make every effort to build 
and maintain secure systems, the most pragmatic among them 
operate their platforms as if the worst-case compromise might 
happen at any moment; indeed, effecting that worst case is likely 
the precise, active goal of malicious actors operating without 
                                                 
 42 2019 Top 50 US Patent Assignees, IFI CLAIMS PAT. SERVS. (Jan. 8, 2020), 
https://www.ificlaims.com/rankings-top-50-2019.htm [https://perma.cc/2NLJ-63TT]. 
 43 Supra Part I. 
 44 Robert McMillan, Twitter Links Hack to Phone-Based Phishing Attack, 
WALL ST. J. (July 30, 2020, 11:37 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/twitter-links-
hack-to-phone-based-phishing-attack-11596166657 [https://perma.cc/23KJ-RYWV]. 
 45 Id. 
 46 What is Social Engineering?, KASPERSKY, https://usa.kaspersky.com/resource-
center/definitions/what-is-social-engineering [https://perma.cc/U4KZ-HVU6] (last 
visited Sept. 16, 2020). 
 47 Jane Chong, Why Is Our Cybersecurity So Insecure?, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 11, 
2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/115145/us-cybersecurity-why-software-
so-insecure [https://perma.cc/BMS3-G8EB]. 
 48 Bruce Schneier, Should U.S. Hackers Fix Cybersecurity Holes or Exploit 
Them?, ATLANTIC (May 19, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/arc
hive/2014/05/should-hackers-fix-cybersecurity-holes-or-exploit-them/371197/ 
[https://perma.cc/N6NL-4ANE]; see also Hurwitz, supra note 28, at 1501–07 
(2017) (describing the challenges of building and operating secure software). 
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pause.49 Among information security professionals, this type of 
thinking is not alarmist—it is axiomatic.50 But despite the 
inevitability of compromise and harm, the available tort theories 
may not provide adequate—or any—relief.  
III. EXISTING AVENUES FOR LIABILITY 
A plaintiff damaged as the result of a malicious actor 
compromising and abusing an internet platform with sufficient 
reach to have substantial economic consequences might bring suit 
under a number of different causes of action but will probably not 
survive the defendant’s motion to dismiss.51 None of the 
mainstream options available for a harmed plaintiff in an internet 
platform case are likely to yield relief. 
A. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
The starting point for identifying criminal and civil liability for 
the fallout of attacks on internet platforms is the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act (“CFAA”).52 While civil liability for compensatory 
damages, injunctive relief, or other equitable relief is available 
against the attacker, the CFAA explicitly exempts internet platform 
providers from civil liability under the provisions of the CFAA 
“for the negligent design or manufacture of computer hardware, 
computer software, or firmware,” which would seem to at best 
                                                 
 49 Bruce Schneier, The Security Mindset, SCHNEIER ON SEC. (Mar. 25, 2008, 5:27 
AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/03/the_security_mi_1.html 
[https://perma.cc/YW49-N33H]. 
 50 See Why Software Remains Insecure, DANIEL MIESSLER (June 6, 2019), 
https://danielmiessler.com/blog/the-reason-software-remains-insecure/ 
[https://perma.cc/V5FU-VRA8] (“Basically, software remains vulnerable because 
the benefits created by insecure products far outweigh the downsides. Once that 
changes, software security will improve—but not a moment before.”); see also 
Bruce Schneier, Why Computers Are Insecure, SCHNEIER ON SEC. (Nov. 1999), 
https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/1999/11/why_computers_are_in.html 
[https://perma.cc/MS2J-FV6L] (“Security engineering involves programming 
Satan’s computer. And Satan’s computer is hard to test.”). 
 51 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 9, at 362–83 (explaining that “most cybertorts 
are stillborn”). 
 52 Russell Gribbell, Ransomware & the Tort of Negligent Cybersecurity, 45 N. 
KY. L. REV. 23, 39 (2018). 
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considerably narrow the window available for tort litigation under 
this legislation.53  
In one roughly analogous case, a federal court granted 
injunctive relief under the civil liability provisions of the CFAA 
against a defendant fraudulently impersonating Facebook accounts 
to obtain credit to run hundreds of thousands of dollars’ worth of 
unpaid advertisements.54 However, when a criminal hacker is 
unavailable and liability is sought instead against the platform that 
facilitated the compromise, federal courts continue to interpret the 
civil liability provisions of the CFAA as not holding platforms 
liable for negligent, insecure software design.55 
B. Contract Liability 
While the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) 
unambiguously identifies computer hardware as a good, the status 
of software, in its various forms, has proved harder to classify.56 If 
software is a good under the U.C.C., then Article 2 provisions 
provide a substantial shield for internet platform providers in the 
form of warranty disclaimers and limitations on liability and 
remedies against users who have agreed to their terms of service.57 
But the conception of software as a tangible good is out of sync 
with the ways software is most commonly used as of 2020: 
through “software licensing” or, most importantly to this analysis, 
through “software-as-a-service” (“SaaS”), an abstraction roughly 
synonymous with the popular term “cloud computing.”58 All of the 
platforms vulnerable to the type of attacks discussed supra are 
exclusively SaaS products, which is most closely analogized as a 
                                                 
 53 18 U.S.C. § 1030; see also Hurwitz, supra note 28, at 1508 (describing 
how, as a practical matter, identifying or even successfully bringing suit against 
the attackers is often impossible due to the “multiplicity of actors and difficulties 
of designing secure systems”). 
 54 Facebook, Inc. v. Grunin, 77 F. Supp. 3d 965, 972 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 55 See, e.g., DHI Grp., Inc. v. Kent, No. H-16-1670, 2017 WL 9939568, at *11 
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2017). 
 56 See Rustad & Kavusturan, supra note 10, at 787–91. 
 57 See Scott, supra note 7, at 436–37. 
 58 See Rustad & Kavusturan, supra note 10, at 779–80. 
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“service offered through access contracts.”59 If software is a 
service, then it is governed by the common law of services and 
Article 2 of the U.C.C. does not apply.60 
Nevertheless, the U.C.C. has been the de facto source of law 
for software contracts in the absence of a better alternative, with 
incoherent legal rationales.61 Commentators are beginning to 
suggest revisions to the U.C.C. to cover the realities of modern 
cloud software, but until then, courts will operate without guidance 
and badly outdated contract law will continue to dominate.62 
However, a tort action might still be available to a non-user 
who has not agreed to the adhesion contract presented by the 
platform provider.63 In other words, even when it applies, the 
antiquated contract law of U.C.C. Article 2 will only protect 
platform providers from users who have voluntarily agreed to their 
terms of service and license agreements.64 While many of the 
platforms of concern here have billions of users, there are still 
many billions who are not users, and thus many who have not 
signed away their rights to bring suit against the providers.65 
Despite having no contractual relationship to the platform 
                                                 
 59 Id. at 780; see supra Section II. 
 60 Rustad & Kavusturan, supra note 10, at 872–73. 
 61 See id. at 824–25 (“[I]t is a legal fiction that software licensing and cloud 
computing involve tangible goods.”). 
 62 See generally id. at 851–72 (proposing a new Article 2B to cover software 
licensing and 2C to cover cloud computing); Holly K. Towle, Enough Already: 
It Is Time to Acknowledge That UCC Article 2 Does Not Apply to Software and 
Other Information, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 531, 536 (2011) (arguing that applying 
Article 2 to software licensing will increasingly lead to wrong results). 
 63 See Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss 
Rule, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 523, 553–56 (2009). 
 64 See, e.g., WECHAT - TERMS OF SERVICE, WECHAT, https://www.wechat
.com/en/service_terms.html [https://perma.cc/MD9J-FUQZ] (last updated Mar. 
21, 2018) (“THESE TERMS GOVERN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
YOU AND US.”). 
 65 See Global Social Media Overview, DATAREPORTAL, https://datareportal.com
/social-media-users [https://perma.cc/FH48-PYYH] (last visited Oct. 4, 2020) 
(estimating roughly half of the world’s population to be users of social media). 
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providers, harmed non-users will nevertheless have standing to 
bring suit under the usual constitutional test.66 
C. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
Historically, internet platforms have been largely insulated 
from liability stemming from content created by their own users 
through Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.67 This 
broadly interpreted provision has effectively immunized internet 
platform providers from any liability resulting from torts 
committed while using their platforms by allowing the providers to 
self-identify as “publishers,” a result upheld many times over in 
court.68 
Thus, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act would 
shield internet platform providers from liability under the theory 
that the hackers who had gained access to the compromised 
accounts were “information content providers” of the type 
specified in Section 230(c)(1).69 While Section 230(e) explicitly 
exempts federal criminal acts from immunity, the status of civil 
actions against defendant platform providers due to the actions of 
third-party criminals are less clear.70 There is substantial case law 
holding that providers are shielded from liability when legitimate 
users of services commit crimes using those services by, for 
                                                 
 66 See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of 
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). Standing under state law 
might vary somewhat from these standards. 
 67 47 U.S.C. § 230; see generally Benjamin Volpe, From Innovation to Abuse: 
Does the Internet Still Need Section 230 Immunity?, 68 CATH. U. L. REV. 597, 
601 (2019) (providing “legislative background along with an accounting of the 
common law history of the CDA, specifically related to § 230 immunity of 
internet service providers and online intermediaries”). 
 68 Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Problem Isn’t Just Backpage: 
Revising Section 230 Immunity, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 453, 458–77 (2018). 
 69 See Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230 [https://perma.cc/FEV2-QKL9] (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2020). 
 70 See VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10306, LIABILITY FOR 
CONTENT HOSTS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE COMMUNICATION DECENCY ACT’S SECTION 
230 at 2 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10306.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WPA-
QVAG]. 
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example, distributing child pornography or selling drugs.71 How 
courts will interpret Section 230 where the content’s author was a 
third party controlling a compromised account to commit a 
malicious act is unclear, but the history of its employment in 
various courts suggests that it might immunize the providers even 
in this context.72  
D. Negligence 
A finding of negligence will require a showing of duty, breach, 
causation, and damages.73 Each of these elements present 
challenges for a showing of provider negligence.74 To begin with, 
to date, courts have not identified a duty of care for software 
manufacturers to produce secure software.75 If a duty could be 
identified, a test for breach would need to be embraced by courts 
out of the many that have been proposed.76 Pecuniary damages 
might be calculable, but would likely still be filtered from claims 
by the economic loss rule discussed infra.77 
                                                 
 71 See, e.g., Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 64–72 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. 
denied, 140 S. Ct. 2761, (2020) (upholding Section 230 immunity for a social 
media platform providing a forum to a known terrorist organization); see 
generally Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not 
Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 
413–14 (2017) (cataloging criminal activities which have enjoyed Section 230 
immunity). 
 72 See Citron & Wittes, supra note 71, at 413–14 (listing particularly 
egregious examples of Section 230 applications); see also Jessica E. Easterly, 
Terror in Tinseltown: Who Is Accountable When Hollywood Gets Hacked, 66 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 331, 355–60 (2016) (considering whether Section 230 
shields platforms when illicit private data is stolen from users by unauthorized, 
malicious users). But see Mike Godwin, Clarence Thomas Is Begging Someone 
to Sue Over Conservatives’ Most-Hated Internet Law, SLATE (Oct. 16, 2020), 
https://slate.com/technology/2020/10/clarence-thomas-section-230-cda-content-
moderation.html [https://perma.cc/D7NU-S5DV]. 
 73 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 19 (2020). 
 74 Scott, supra note 7, at 442. 
 75 See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 8, at 1567. 
 76 Scott, supra note 7, at 448. 
 77 See infra, Section V.C.3. 
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The most difficult element of negligence to establish in the 
context of an internet security breach is causation.78 Because 
software is so complex, there might often be but-for causation in 
the sense that a coding error led to an exploit.79 For the same 
reason, however, causation might be found to be too remote for a 
finding of proximate causation, especially if a standard of 
foreseeability is used.80 Even if a security compromise is 
inevitable, as a question of fact left to the jury, the level of 
complexity in modern software systems provides ample fodder for 
demonstrating that the connection between the defendant’s action 
and the plaintiff’s injury is too “attenuated, remote, or freakish” to 
prevail.81  
Overall, the negligence approach, which evolved around 
relatively simple physical events causing physical harm, is 
incompatible with the complexity of internet-based torts. “[T]he 
difficulty of imposing liability in negligence and contract models 
[stemming from cybersecurity failures] has effectively created a 
‘strict fault’ regime . . . which is governed by negligence and 
contract law in name only [and in which] sophisticated parties 
pervasively externalize risk upon unsophisticated parties.”82 
The lens of negligence could also be focused on the decisions 
of internet platforms prior to the creation of the software that 
resulted in a compromise.83 If the risk cannot be eliminated even 
after taking reasonable precautions—for example if a compromise 
is inevitable—then negligence might lie where an argument can be 
made that the platform providers never should have engaged in the 
activity in the first place.84 However, even if it is arguably 
unreasonable to provide a technology like Twitter to world leaders 
                                                 
 78 See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 8, at 1602–03 (“Without a proximate 
cause limitation, internet security breaches could create boundless liability.”). 
 79 See Scott, supra note 7, at 448. 
 80 See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 8, at 1601–02. 
 81 See JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS § 12.01, at 179 (6th 
ed. 2018). 
 82 Hurwitz, supra note 28, at 1528. 
 83 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 20 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2010). 
 84 See id. 
310 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 22: 2 
and governments, the difficulty in adjudicating a claim of 
institutional incompetence means that a finding of no duty is the 
most likely outcome.85 
E. Strict Product Liability 
While the full force of strict product liability doctrine might be 
brought to bear if software is viewed as a product like any other,86 
courts have demonstrated an unwillingness to stretch the doctrine 
to include software as a general rule.87 It is a fundamental theorem 
of strict product liability that the manufacturer of a defective 
product is best situated to bear the cost of personal injury or injury 
to property.88 But courts have been mixed on the question of 
whether software is a product or service,89 similar to the confusion 
surrounding the application of the U.C.C., discussed supra.90 
Product liability suits can find purchase under a theory of 
garden-variety negligence when inadequate warnings or 
instructions or defective designs are at issue.91 Alternatively, if the 
products are adequately designed but not manufactured according 
to specification, a finding of no-fault strict liability is possible.92 
For damages due to a software security compromise, it must be 
determined whether the compromise was the result of the design of 
                                                 
 85 See id. at § 7, cmt. f (“For example, when a plaintiff claims that it is 
negligent merely to engage in the activity of manufacturing a product, the 
competing social concerns and affected groups would be appropriate 
considerations for a court in deciding to adopt a no-duty rule.”). 
 86 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 19 reporter’s notes to cmt. 
d (AM. L. INST. 1998). 
 87 Scott, supra note 7, at 469. 
 88 See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Cal. 
1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). 
 89 See Scott, supra note 7, at 466–67 (“While these factors may not argue in 
favor of finding all software to be products, they strongly favor finding software 
that is supposed to provide security for corporate and government computer 
systems to be a product for product liability purposes.”); see also Bryan H. Choi, 
Crashworthy Code, 94 WASH. L. REV. 39, n. 142 (2019) (listing “tantalizing 
dicta” suggesting that software might be considered a product by courts). 
 90 See supra Section III.B. 
 91 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 19 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1998). 
 92 See id. § 2. 
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the software or the implementation of that design in code.93 
Distinguishing these two is likely to be highly fact-specific and 
complex, and thus unlikely to yield relief.94 Having surveyed the 
avenues for recompense available via various contemporary 
theories of tort liability and finding them wanting, a novel 
application of the doctrine of strict liability for abnormally 
dangerous activities is considered next. 
IV. STRICT LIABILITY FOR ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS 
ACTIVITIES 
The lack of a clear cause of action for harmed plaintiffs in the 
event of catastrophic fallout from the inevitable compromise of an 
internet platform is alarming. Because the body of law that has 
grown alongside the internet has kept platform providers 
well-shielded from liability, some commentators have suggested a 
new route: the application of strict liability for these providers under 
a theory of abnormally dangerous activities.95 This application, 
however, will stretch the doctrine well past the envelope of the 
contexts in which it has traditionally been applied.96 
A. Abnormally Dangerous Activities Defined 
The story of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities 
(“SLADA”)97 in its modern form usually begins with the 
celebrated English case of Rylands v. Fletcher98 from the 
                                                 
 93 See Scott, supra note 7, at 459. 
 94 See id. at 467–71; Hurwitz, supra note 28, at 1523 (“Given the near 
impossibility of designing defect-free software, many commentators believe that 
it will be exceptionally difficult to successfully bring a products liability 
claim.”). 
 95 Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and 
Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 277–
96 (2007); Hurwitz, supra note 28, at 1526. 
 96 Hurwitz, supra note 28, at 1527–28. 
 97 The helpful acronym coined by Professor Boston is borrowed here. Gerald 
W. Boston, Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activity: The Negligence 
Barrier, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 597, 598 (1999). 
 98 Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330. 
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mid-nineteenth century.99 In Rylands, the wealthy defendant John 
Rylands constructed a water reservoir over abandoned coal mine 
shafts that connected with the active coal mine owned by Thomas 
Fletcher on neighboring property.100 Probably due to an error on the 
part of the builders, the partially-filled reservoir burst downwards, 
resulting in cascading flooding of the shafts underneath into 
Fletcher’s adjacent mine.101 Fletcher brought suit for negligence 
and the English courts of appeals ultimately decided for Fletcher, 
memorably articulating what would come to be known as strict 
liability for abnormally dangerous activities.102 The decision from 
the intermediate appellate court highlighted the elements of 
outsized risk and foreseeability now found in the modern 
formulation, and the holding of the highest court is associated with 
the “common usage” portion of the doctrine.103 The Rylands 
decisions are also notable in that they were an early example of 
common-law courts departing from the rigid, procedure-dominated 
writ system to a more flexible application of substantive law to a 
novel situation,104 a suggestion which is again urged here. 
The modern doctrine of SLADA provides an avenue for 
no-fault findings of liability against tortfeasors under limited 
circumstances.105 In contrast with negligence law, in which the 
primary policy rationale is to encourage those with a legal duty to 
exercise reasonable care, strict liability is appropriate when the risk 
cannot easily be eliminated and a reduction of the risky activity is 
preferable.106 The doctrine focuses on the inherent danger of certain 
activities, not on the inherent danger of particular materials.107 
                                                 
 99 See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Rylands v. Fletcher: Tort Law’s 
Conscience, in TORT STORIES 207, 209–10 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. 
Sugarman eds., 2003). 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 210. 
 102 Rylands, L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 339–40. 
 103 See Abraham, supra note 99, at 213–14. 
 104 Id. at 214–215. 
 105 See 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 385 (database updated October 2020). 
 106 See James T. Graves, Note, Minnesota’s PCI Law: A Small Step on the 
Path to A Statutory Duty of Data Security Due Care, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1115, 1139–40 (2008). 
 107 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 443 (2d ed. 2020). 
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Importantly for software security, the doctrine assumes that “a 
highly significant risk . . . remains . . . even when all actors 
exercise reasonable care.”108 Distilled to its essence, SLADA is a 
doctrine designed to “ensur[e] that liability for harms be assigned 
to parties best able to bear it.”109 
The Third Restatement offers two factors to consider when 
determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous: “(1) the 
activity creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical 
harm even when reasonable care is exercised by all actors; and 
(2) the activity is not one of common usage.”110 An activity is 
abnormally dangerous if it satisfies both factors and need not 
necessarily provide substantial value or utility.111  
B. The Modern Scope of SLADA 
The doctrine of SLADA evolved as the industrial revolution 
blossomed in England and America, and the trend towards 
requiring fault for a finding of liability was ascendant in courts.112 
As the world became blanketed with modern technologies, the 
potentially devastating effects of physical injury from probabilistic, 
catastrophic mechanical failures gave rise to a growing 
consciousness that a revised allocation of risk was needed, at least 
in some cases.113 
Despite the historical and precedential association of SLADA 
with physical damages from large-scale disasters, courts have 
                                                 
 108 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 20 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2010). 
 109 Hurwitz, supra note 28, at 1525. 
 110 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 20 (AM. L. INST. 2010). This update to the Restatement reduced the 
SLADA factors in number from six to two but it is not unusual to see courts still 
referring to the Second Restatement factors. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 520 (AM. L. INST. 1977). See, e.g., Navelski v. Int’l Paper Co., 771 F. App’x. 
949, 952 (11th Cir. 2019). 
 111 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 20 cmt. k (AM. L. INST. 2010). The value to the community is subsumed 
by the question of common usage in the revised Restatement. 
 112 See Joseph H. King, Jr., A Goals-Oriented Approach to Strict Tort Liability 
for Abnormally Dangerous Activities, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 341, 344–46 (1996). 
 113 See id. 
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varied widely in their applications of the doctrine to the facts 
presented by creative plaintiffs invoking it.114 The risks and 
dangers under discussion here are novel, and the application of 
SLADA to the new fact patterns of the twenty-first century is not 
affirmatively foreclosed by statute or precedent, although there has 
been no clear application of the doctrine beyond the canonical fact 
patterns to date.115 
For example, when a foreign bank brought suit against a 
domestic bank in Dubai Islamic Bank v. Citibank,116 it requested 
the court invoke SLADA against the defendant, alleging that the 
defendant was “actively recruiting known financial terrorists . . . 
each of whom is capable of destabilizing an entire country if not 
an entire region, and providing them any service for which they 
are willing to pay.”117 The court rejected the plaintiff’s proposal to 
extend the doctrine beyond the physical realm, stating that the 
court “does not feel it is appropriate to expand the scope of the 
strict liability doctrine to embrace the banking and financial issues 
presented here.”118  
In rejecting another scenario with roughly analogous geometry, 
courts have found that utilities operating physical plants as remote 
sources of services to the public are not examples of abnormally 
dangerous activities.119 In United States v. Southern California 
                                                 
 114 See, e.g., King v. United States, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Colo. 1999) 
(campfires); Thomalen v. Marriott Corp., 880 F. Supp. 74 (D. Mass. 1995) (fire-
eating); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mun. of Anchorage, 788 P.2d 726, 728 
(Alaska 1990) (city water delivery systems); Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 
S.W.2d 854 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (radioactive emissions); King, Jr., supra note 
112; see also id. at n.220 (highlighting various cases with plaintiffs that have 
applied a SLADA theory of liability for purely economic damages with mixed 
results). 
 115 Choi, supra note 89, at 51–52. 
 116 Dubai Islamic Bank v. Citibank, N.A., 126 F. Supp. 2d 659 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000). 
 117 Id. at 668 (emphasis added). 
 118 Id. at 669. 
 119 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 20 reporter’s notes to cmt. h (AM. L. INST. 2010). See, e.g., Bickett v. 
Countrymark Energy Res., LLC, 250 F. Supp. 3d 309, 321–22 (W.D. Ky. 2017) 
(citing Ky. Utils. Co. v. Auto Crane Co., 674 S.W.2d 15, 18 (Ky. App. 1983)). 
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Edison Co.,120 a private hydroelectric utility plant was the 
proximate cause of a major forest fire.121 The government argued 
for strict liability, but the district court concluded that the “[claim 
that the] hydroelectric utility plant is an ultrahazardous activity 
conflicts with California law and is not supported by existing 
federal statutory or decisional law.”122  
Despite a disappointing lack of hints of modernization from 
recent case law, the SLADA doctrine should nevertheless be 
applied to abnormally dangerous activities conducted on internet 
platforms, even where the harms are not physical. 
V. STRICT LIABILITY FOR ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES 
SHOULD APPLY TO DANGEROUS INTERNET PLATFORMS 
SLADA should be applied to remedy economic damages 
resulting from the compromise of dangerous internet platforms by 
malicious actors. The highly significant risks of these platforms’ 
activities are manifestly foreseeable, are not preventable even with 
reasonable care, and are not in common usage.123 This section 
proposes a rule for the application of SLADA to this scenario and 
grapples with the objections that flow naturally from the history 
and precedent of the associated common law. 
A. A Proposed SLADA Doctrine for Dangerous Internet Platforms 
Professor Danielle Citron was among the first to propose the 
application of SLADA to “bursting cyber-reservoirs of personal 
data” in analogy to the infamous bursting water-reservoirs of 
Rylands.124 But perhaps Citron did not take the metaphor far 
enough, for modern citizens are also “adjacent” to internet 
platforms with such latent power to do physical and economic 
damage that the metaphor can be safely extended to include them 
as well: “[a] third party’s criminal acts are the natural 
                                                 
 120 United States v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 964 (E.D. Cal. 2004). 
 121 See id. at 969–70. 
 122 Id. at 991. 
 123 See Hurwitz, supra note 28, at 1527 (“[T]he cybersecurity context arguably 
presents a more ‘textbook case’ for the use of strict liability than seen in most 
‘textbook cases.’”). 
 124 Citron, supra note 95, at 243–96. 
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consequences of maintaining information reservoirs in much the 
same way that flooding due to gravity or negligence naturally 
accompanied water reservoirs.”125 
The scenario exemplified by the July 2020 Twitter hack is 
somewhat different in kind: although it is similar to the leakage of 
confidential data in that it is due to the inevitable actions of 
malicious actors, Citron’s “data breach” involves damages from 
theft or misappropriation of data, not damages due to the platform 
itself.126 The torts suggested by the July 2020 Twitter hack are 
more akin to damages caused by a private nuisance, a cause of 
action that shares common roots with SLADA.127 
Strict liability for dangerous internet platforms has been 
proposed by several commentators, but only in the context of data 
breaches.128 But the scope and magnitude of the dangers that 
internet platforms now expose the world to in the worst-case 
scenario have quickly moved past those dangers associated with 
now-routine data breaches.129 
Therefore, courts should consider carefully the observation 
made by Judge Posner: 
By making the actor strictly liable—by denying him in other words an 
excuse based on his inability to avoid accidents by being more 
careful—we give him an incentive, missing in a negligence regime, to 
experiment with methods of preventing accidents that involve not 
greater exertions of care, assumed to be futile, but instead relocating, 
                                                 
 125 Id. at 270–71. In 2020, we have arguably moved beyond “adjacent” in the 
sense that the negative effects can be felt regardless of where we physically are, 
or whether we in any sense opted-into the danger. 
 126 See id. at 255. 
 127 See Steven Kam, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi: Trespass to Chattels & A Doctrine 
of Cyber-Nuisance, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 427, 440 n.79 (2004) (describing 
the evolution of nuisance law from early strict liability doctrine). 
 128 See Hurwitz, supra note 28, at 1498 n.1 (enumerating legal and industry 
scholarship on the subject). 
 129 Williams & Drew, supra note 5, at 14; see also Danielle Jablanski, Herbert 
S. Lin, & Harold A. Trinkunas, Retweets to Midnight, in THREE TWEETS TO 
MIDNIGHT: EFFECTS OF THE GLOBAL INFORMATION ECOSYSTEM ON THE RISK OF 
NUCLEAR CONFLICT (Harold A. Trinkunas, Herbert Lin, & Benjamin Loehrke 
eds., 2020). 
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changing, or reducing (perhaps to the vanishing point) the activity 
giving rise to the accident.130 
SLADA should be applied against dangerous internet platforms 
when their activities have achieved such scale that an inevitable 
compromise by a malicious actor has a reasonable chance of 
resulting in substantial damages to third parties who are not users 
of the platform. Furthermore, if invoked, courts should reject any 
attempt to stretch the tortured interpretation of Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act even further to cover the 
“publications” of non-user cybercriminals.131 
Whether SLADA applies, and in particular whether the 
activities of an internet platform should be considered abnormally 
dangerous, should be a question of law evaluated according to 
several factors: 
(1) whether the platform has, as users, public figures or 
organizations; 
(2) whether those users have the potential to effect 
significant damages by their words or acts; 
(3) whether the words or acts of users of the platform are 
visible to the public; 
(4) whether the publicly visible words or acts of users of 
the platform are construed to be directly attributable to 
the users; and 
(5) whether there exists a reasonable likelihood of 
identifiable, substantial economic damages resulting 
from a presumed compromise.132 
This application of SLADA is an extreme remedy; courts 
should justifiably be wary and apply it only when the risk is 
maximal and the specific alleged damages are reasonably 
                                                 
 130 Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). 
 131 See, e.g., Citron & Wittes, supra note 71, at 415–18 (suggesting that courts 
adopt a narrower reading of the statute and limit its application to actors 
operating in good faith). 
 132 Platforms meeting criteria (1) through (4) are “dangerous internet 
platforms.” Evaluation of (5) gives rise to the cause of action for particularly 
situated plaintiffs. 
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foreseeable.133 As it is a form of SLADA, no finding of fault or 
defect is necessary for liability to take hold. 
Once a platform has grown such that it becomes inherently 
dangerous, it will need to “experiment with methods of preventing 
accidents that involve . . . relocating, changing, or reducing 
(perhaps to the vanishing point) the activity.”134 While eliminating 
the activity altogether is not productive, for dangerous internet 
platforms, this could mean a cap on the reach of accounts of some 
public figures.135 Platforms could be forced to implement expensive 
measures like human verification of posts or requiring even more 
substantial security procedures on certain high-profile accounts.136 
One commentator suggests that strict liability and “cyber 
insurance” should be tightly coupled as a means to implement 
strict liability for data breaches while simultaneously statutorily 
limiting damages, ensuring the willingness of insurance companies 
to underwrite policies.137 Such a scheme would also help to 
mitigate a possible economic concern that could result from 
implementation of SLADA across the industry, specifically, the 
cascading, shifting of costs to consumers as a result of the specter 
of no-fault findings of liability.138 
Finally, the unmistakable social value that dangerous internet 
platforms provide does not conflict with the application of 
SLADA: 
                                                 
 133 Baker v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 232 F. Supp. 3d 233, 
248 (N.D.N.Y. 2017) (“[A] private suit for damages [might lie] when an 
individual or smaller group sustains a special loss that is different in kind from 
the harm suffered by the rest of the community.”) (internal quotation omitted). 
The challenging burden of identifying market segments particularly vulnerable 
to compromise should fall to the platform providers. 
 134 Ind. Harbor Belt, 916 F.2d at 1177 (citation omitted). 
 135 See Joshua Boyd, The Most Followed Accounts on Twitter, BRANDWATCH 
(Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.brandwatch.com/blog/most-twitter-followers/ 
[https://perma.cc/7LHW-T6CH] (cataloging Twitter accounts with tens or 
hundreds of millions of followers). 
 136 See About Account Security, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/safety-
and-security/account-security-tips [https://perma.cc/QKG7-RGXF] (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2020). For example, two-factor authentication or updated client 
recommendations could be mandated. 
 137 See Hurwitz, supra note 28, at 1499–1500. 
 138 See id. at 1527–29. 
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[SLADA] rests on the assumption that the activity’s advantages are 
apparently substantial enough as to render reasonable the defendant’s 
choice to engage in the activity . . . . [T]he point that the activity 
provides substantial value or utility is of little direct relevance to the 
question whether the activity should properly bear strict liability . . . . 
[I]t is their commonness rather than their value that directly pertains to 
the strict-liability issue.139 
SLADA’s suggested application here is not meant to deter 
platforms from existing or even prospering, but rather to exercise 
extreme caution when its casual use by public figures ushers in 
catastrophic risk. 
B. Abnormally Dangerous Activities and the Goals of SLADA 
The reorganized Restatement (Third) of Torts moved SLADA 
into a volume subtitled “Physical & Emotional Harm,” calling into 
question its applicability to purely economic loss.140 However, the 
revised strict liability section is prefaced by stating that “strict 
liability is one area of tort law in which a page of history can be at 
least as relevant as a page of logic.”141 Therefore, this section 
surveys the policy goals underlying the doctrine and adds to the 
growing mass of commentary arguing that strict liability should be 
considered by courts in the context of insecure software.142 
One American Law Institute reporter distilled the revised Third 
Restatement’s scattered rationales for SLADA into six elements 
which will be briefly considered in turn against the proposed 
application.143 First, the additional liability imposed by SLADA is 
meant to encourage defendants engaging in dangerous activities to 
                                                 
 139 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 20 cmt. k (AM. L. INST. 2010). 
 140 Id. at foreword. 
 141 Id. at ch. 4 scope note. 
 142 Scott, supra note 7, at 469 n.267; see also Citron, supra note 95, at 277–
96. But see Choi, supra note 89, at 51–52 (arguing that SLADA is an outdated 
form of strict liability and that strict products liability or no-fault insurance are 
better doctrinal fits). 
 143 See Kenneth W. Simons, The Restatement (Third) of Torts & Traditional 
Strict Liability: Robust Rationales, Slender Doctrines, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
1355, 1359 (2009). 
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take even more care than they would under a negligence regime.144 
This rationale is predicated on the theory that the marginal cost of 
reducing risk beyond a negligence standard of care is small.145 
Additionally, many abnormally dangerous activities are so 
destructive that it is often impossible for plaintiffs to obtain the 
evidence needed for a showing of breach.146 Strict liability 
incentivizes defendants in those situations to take more enhanced 
precautions than they would take in an ordinary negligence 
regime.147  
This rationale militates both for and against SLADA for 
dangerous internet platforms. The costs of incremental 
improvements to security for internet platform providers are 
certainly not just marginal, and indeed may increase without 
bound.148 The fact that substantially better security is not 
necessarily achievable even with substantial additional investment 
distinguishes this risk from the ones contemplated by the 
Restatement. On the other hand, establishing evidence of causation 
in a negligence suit might well be difficult or impossible.149 
Second, SLADA is meant to apply a corrective to the 
magnitude or frequency of dangerous activities.150 Limiting 
“activity” is antithetical to the modus operandi of internet 
platforms that depend on the network effect for increased 
                                                 
 144 Id. at 1359 (citing the example of explosives destroying proof that would 
be needed for a finding of negligence). 
 145 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 21 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“[Because] in most instances a 
reasonable nonnegligent fence will succeed in restraining the defendant’s 
livestock, the added burden that strict liability places on the livestock owner is 
itself limited.”). 
 146 See Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp., 810 P.2d 917, 922 (Wash. 1991) (imposing 
strict liability when a fireworks misfire destroyed all evidence of what caused 
the misfire). 
 147 See Simons, supra note 143, at 1359. 
 148 See Rainer Böhme, Security Metrics and Security Investment Models, 5 
INT’L WORKSHOP ON SEC. 10, 11 fig.1 (2010). 
 149 See Scott, supra note 7, at 448–49; supra Section III.D. 
 150 See Simons, supra note 143, at 1360. 
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revenues.151 However, if the dangerous “activity” is instead defined 
as that portion of the platforms’ operations involving exposure to 
abnormal danger, as opposed to routine use, it can be reduced in 
creative ways by internet platforms.152 If exposed to liability under 
a SLADA theory, platforms might be forced to implement 
expensive measures like human verification of publications or to 
require even more substantial, onerous security procedures on 
certain high-profile accounts, perhaps to the point of discouraging 
use.153 
Third, SLADA is justified when the defendant’s activity 
imposes a risk on individual members of society that does not 
reciprocally impose risk back on the defendant.154 Users of 
dangerous internet platforms are exposed to a variety of risks, and 
their perceptions of those risks to themselves and third parties vary 
widely according to their level of sophistication.155 The platform 
providers, on the other hand, are surely fully cognizant of the risks 
of compromise, and are themselves potentially exposed to those 
risks. 
Along the same lines, the fourth rationale concerns 
non-reciprocal benefit: whether the dangerous activity confers a 
benefit on the defendant not shared by the members of the 
community.156 A converse statement of the “common usage” prong 
of the SLADA Restatement criteria, this rationale highlights that 
“the appeal of strict liability for an activity is stronger when its 
risks are imposed on third parties while its benefits are 
concentrated among a few.”157 However, while the benefits of 
                                                 
 151 See Feng Zhu & Marco Iansiti, Why Some Platforms Thrive and Others Don’t, 
HARV. BUS. REV., https://hbr.org/2019/01/why-some-platforms-thrive-and-others-
don’t [https://perma.cc/35V8-D7LS] (last visited Oct. 2, 2020). 
 152 See infra Section V.A. 
 153 See Boyd, supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 154 Simons, supra note 143, at 1361–62. 
 155 See, e.g., Paul van Schaik et. al, Security and Privacy in Online Social 
Networking: Risk Perceptions and Precautionary Behaviour, 78 COMPUT. IN 
HUM. BEHAV. 283, 292–93 (2018) (presenting an analysis of perceptions of risk 
and precautionary behavior among Facebook users). 
 156 Simons, supra note 143, at 1363–66. 
 157 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 20 cmt. j (AM. L. INST. 2010). 
322 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 22: 2 
using an internet platform can fairly be described as diffuse, the 
benefits received by high-profile actors, like heads of state, are of a 
different kind entirely from those obtained by, say, teenagers. For 
example, the ability to globally announce a major policy change is 
not, in practice, shared by most users, who are enjoying the 
platforms for social reasons.158 The benefits to the platform 
providers, on the other hand, scale roughly with numbers of users, 
whatever benefit those users may derive from it, and affected third 
parties might receive no benefit at all. In other words, the bulk of 
the benefits are retained by the platform providers and a small 
number of elite users. 
Fifth, application of SLADA is associated with near-exclusive 
causation, a characterization fraught with philosophical 
hangnails.159 Regardless of the difficulties of pinning down the 
definition of causation in the context of dangerous internet 
platforms, if the scope of liability is limited to non-users, the case 
for exclusive causation is even stronger than the canonical example 
of blasting, wherein the injured resident could (theoretically) 
simply move.160 SLADA is “designed largely to protect innocent 
third parties or innocent bystanders.”161 The potential pecuniary 
harm caused by dangerous internet platforms will exist as long as 
large numbers of individuals rely on it, which is something an 
individual plaintiff cannot control.  
Sixth, the Restatement affords weight to the community’s 
sense of fairness: “Basic public attitudes tend to be accepting of 
familiar and traditional risks, even while apprehensive of risks that 
are uncommon and novel. The law should be respectful of public 
                                                 
 158 See Aaron Smith, Why Americans Use Social Media, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 15, 
2011), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2011/11/15/why-americans-use-social-
media/ [https://perma.cc/APS3-LQT3] (“Roughly two thirds of social media 
users say that staying in touch with current friends and family members is a 
major reason they use these sites.”). 
 159 See Simons, supra note 143, at 1368–72 (“[I]t is either incoherent or false 
to claim that the person who engages in blasting is the only or principal cause of 
the victim’s harm.”). 
 160 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 20 cmt. k (AM. L. INST. 2010). 
 161 Id. § 24. 
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attitudes of this sort.”162 It is hard to say how the public at large 
would perceive the fairness of strict liability for dangerous internet 
platforms under these circumstances; the phenomenon of damages 
at this scale is too new to predict. But it might be equally said that 
the public does not appreciate the danger posed by these apparently 
innocuous tools. It might also be labeled unfair that an accident 
due to the lax security practices of a moderately-sized private 
company in California can have instantaneous, severe, or 
nationwide repercussions at all. 
The goals of SLADA as delineated by the Third Restatement 
are consonant with the risks dangerous internet platforms force on 
society. But application of the doctrine will nevertheless face 
substantial obstacles erected by common law precedent. 
C. Obstacles in Applying SLADA to Dangerous Internet Platforms 
An application of SLADA to non-physical, purely economic 
damages to third parties due to the malicious actions of 
cybercriminals encounters substantial precedential hurdles. Here, 
the first subsection circumvents the traditional application of 
SLADA only to physical harms with recourse to underlying policy 
goals. The next subsection recasts the ordinary common usage 
objection in light of the way modern technology is actually used. 
Then, a route around the bar against damages for purely economic 
harms is identified. Finally, the last subsection argues that that 
route should be exploited to avail plaintiffs of tort liability to 
redress damages caused by the actions of third-party criminals 
where a special relationship due to foreseeability exists. 
1. Physical Damages 
At early common law, injuries in tort were generally associated 
with direct contact, and fault was seen as related to the physical 
actions of the defendant.163 SLADA evolved during the industrial 
revolution as a parallel path to liability alongside negligence, 
usually portrayed as growing out of the decision in Rylands. 
                                                 
 162 Simons, supra note 143, at 1372–73 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 20 cmt. j (AM. L. INST. 
2010)). 
 163 See King, Jr., supra note 112, at 343–44. 
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“Rylands is the first and foremost exemplar of the strict liability 
alternative to negligence liability for accidental personal injury and 
property damage.”164 As the doctrine homogenized across the 
country, neither the First nor the Second Restatements specified 
“physical” harm in their respective SLADA sections, specifying 
only serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others.165 The 
Third Restatement explicitly added “physical harm,” but the 
comments and reporters’ notes do not explicitly rule out 
non-physical damages.166 
Despite these recent updates, some courts still relying on the 
Second Restatement have shown flexibility regarding non-physical 
damages.167 For example, in Peters v. Amoco Oil Co.,168 when 
underground leaking storage tanks belonging to an oil company 
bled into neighboring properties, but had not yet caused any 
physical damage, a district court in Alabama rejected the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss the SLADA claim, interpreting the 
Restatement to “not require physical contact or damage, and 
[finding that the] Defendants [failed] to provide any authority 
containing such requirement.”169  
In another groundwater contamination suit against oil 
companies, Harthman v. Texaco, Inc.,170 a district court rejected the 
defendant’s summary judgment motion, interpreting the 
Restatement’s requirement for “harm” in SLADA cases broadly as 
“[including] the impairment of pecuniary advantage, intangible 
rights and other legally recognized interests” and holding that the 
                                                 
 164 Abraham, supra note 99, at 226. 
 165 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 519–20 (AM. L. INST. 1938); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (AM. L. INST. 1977). 
 166 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 20 (AM. L. INST. 2020). However, the definition of “physical harm” 
provided does militate strongly against this interpretation. See id. at § 4. 
 167 See, e.g., Brantley v. Int’l Paper Co., No. CV 2:09-230-DCR, 2017 WL 
2292767, at *5 (M.D. Ala. May 24, 2017) (“[E]xpansion of the doctrine to other 
activities has not been foreclosed.”). 
 168 Peters v. Amoco Oil Co., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (M.D. Ala. 1999). 
 169 Id. at 1286. 
 170 Harthman v. Texaco, Inc. (In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig.), 909 F. 
Supp. 991 (D.V.I. 1995). 
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plaintiff “may recover for negligence or strict liability without 
showing that they have suffered physical harm.”171 
Beyond interpretations of what the reporters of the Restatement 
intended, convincing a court to apply SLADA to non-physical 
damages requires recourse to the policy justifications of SLADA, 
which are not themselves necessarily linked to physical harms.172 
Advocates should focus on the novel nature and foreseeability of 
abnormal danger in lieu of the black-letter Restatement text. 
2. Common Usage 
The “common usage” prong of the Restatement’s SLADA test 
ensures that the doctrine is only enforced against “abnormal” 
activities.173 An activity is one of common usage if “it is carried on 
by a large fraction of the people in the community.”174 This is so 
even if the activity is engaged in by only a single party, even if 
substantial numbers of people are somehow “connected to the 
activity.”175 When considering SLADA for new technologies like 
“cyber-physical” systems, one scholar warns that “technological 
novelty should not be conflated with abnormality.”176 
Still, while it is undeniable that dangerous internet platforms 
are in extremely common usage, the metaphors used to exemplify 
common usage do not graft well onto this case. At first glance, 
                                                 
 171 Id. at 999 (invoking the Restatement (Second) of Torts general definition 
of “harm” in section 7, cmt. b and broadly interpreting the wording of section 
519, “harm to the person, land or chattels”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 7 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(1) 
(AM. L. INST. 1977); see also Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 516 A.2d 990, 1006 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (“Case law in other jurisdictions also supports the 
proposition that plaintiffs may recover for economic injuries that defendant’s 
pollution caused, even though there was no physical damage to plaintiffs’ 
property.”). 
 172 See supra Section V.B. 
 173 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 20 cmt. j (AM. L. INST. 2020). 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Choi, supra note 89, at 51 (considering looming examples such as 
autonomous vehicles deployed in dense residential areas as unlikely to be found 
to be abnormally dangerous). 
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dangerous internet platforms could be analogized to power lines.177 
Like power lines, access to the platforms is distributed to the 
community via the internet, itself physically a network of wires.178 
The power company is said to be “engaging in the [abnormally 
dangerous] activity,” but since the distribution network—the 
wires—are ubiquitous, people are “connected to the activity” and 
power lines are therefore in common usage.179 
However, this analogy oversimplifies the presence of power 
lines in society. Residences receive standard residential power 
connections, with well-understood safety considerations. On the 
other hand, industrial installations have extremely high-power 
demands, involving more significant safety procedures, 
unattainable by normal power consumers.180 Dangerous internet 
platforms place the industrial connection in the palms of prominent 
public figures who similarly lack the ability to implement 
improved security. Additionally, unlike power lines, which are a 
physical embodiment of a danger in common usage, there is no 
physical reminder, or indeed any reminder at all during routine use, 
that internet platforms could pose any sort of catastrophic 
danger.181 Finally, while social media posts taken as a whole are 
nothing short of torrential, the discrete uses of dangerous internet 
platforms by actors capable of effecting severe consequences on 
markets constitute only a minute fraction of total uses.182  
                                                 
 177 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 20 cmt. j (AM. L. INST. 2010). 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
 180 See, e.g., Dennis K. Neitzel, Electrical Safety for Industrial and 
Commercial Power Systems, 2016 IEEE IAS ELEC. SAFETY WORKSHOP, 114, 
115–20 (summarizing safety procedures for industrial and commercial power 
systems). 
 181 Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/en/tos 
[https://perma.cc/6K9M-MC98] (last updated June 18, 2020) (waiving liability for 
“ANY CONDUCT OR CONTENT OF ANY THIRD PARTY ON THE SERVICES, 
INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY DEFAMATORY, OFFENSIVE OR 
ILLEGAL CONDUCT OF OTHER USERS OR THIRD PARTIES”). 
 182 Compare Twitter Usage Statistics, INTERNET LIVE STATS, 
https://www.internetlivestats.com/twitter-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/KZ5W-FWTE] 
(last visited Oct. 18, 2020) (counting hundreds of millions of Tweets sent 
globally each day), with National Politics on Twitter: Small Share of U.S. Adults 
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Another example of a commonly used and omnipresent utility 
with underappreciated inherent destructive power involves the 
underground gasoline storage tanks underlying typical gas 
stations.183 Although the activities of a gas station in providing gas, 
and the reciprocal activities of a patron in purchasing and pumping 
gas are obviously quite familiar, the threat posed by a catastrophic 
failure of these tanks while standing atop them is potentially 
uncommon, although courts are split on this question.184 No 
bright-line rule has been identified. For example, in Peters, a 
federal court found the question of whether the storage of gasoline 
would constitute an “unusual and extraordinary” use of property to 
be a fact-bound question for the jury.185 
Still, American courts have shown an overall reluctance to 
push the boundaries of common usage since the emergence of 
another potentially spectacularly powerful source of risk in the 
middle of the twentieth century: nuclear energy.186 Moreover, what 
is considered common usage varies widely between jurisdictions, 
implying a reluctance by courts to make bright-line rules about 
strict liability and reinforcing the context-dependent nature of the 
common usage determination.187 Also, humanity’s relationship to 
risk has become more comfortable as people have become 
surrounded by technology, and life, at least relative to technology, 
has in fact become safer.188 Nevertheless, these observations about 
context and technology in the history of the common law mean 
only that where the doctrine has once moved in one direction, it 
can move again where technology has changed in ways never 
anticipated.189 
                                                                                                             
Produce Majority of Tweets, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 23, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/10/23/national-politics-on-twitter-small-
share-of-u-s-adults-produce-majority-of-tweets/ [https://perma.cc/TA7B-H5W6]. 
 183 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 20 reporter’s notes to cmt. j (AM. L. INST. 2010). 
 184 Id. 
 185 Peters v. Amoco Oil Co., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1286 (M.D. Ala. 1999). 
 186 Abraham, supra note 99, at 224. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. at 227 (“We study Rylands not only because of what it was and is, but 
also because of what it might have been and might still become.”). 
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3. Purely Economic Loss 
Another formidable obstacle faced by a plaintiff affected by a 
compromise of an internet platform causing significant, lasting 
pecuniary fallout is the economic loss rule.190 Commonly stated as 
there can never be recovery for purely economic loss in a tort 
action,191 the Third Restatement more fully states that “there is no 
liability in tort for economic loss caused by negligence in the 
performance or negotiation of a contract between the parties.”192 
The economic loss doctrine is largely predicated on the notion 
that the risk of purely economic loss should be allocated exclusively 
according to contract law.193 The doctrine assumes that the 
consequential damages flowing from the accident are the result of the 
plaintiff’s disappointed expectations.194 In other words, the economic 
loss doctrine assumes the existence of a contract in the first place.195 
As between strangers with no contractual relationship, the 
majority of jurisdictions follow the 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet 
Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Center, Inc.196 decision.197 In 532 Madison 
Ave. Gourmet, the New York Court of Appeals held that monetary 
damages to neighboring businesses stemming from the economic 
fallout due to a collapsed, negligently constructed building were 
foreclosed, absent some special relationship between the parties.198 
The court focused on the unlimited spectrum of liability that 
defendants might be exposed to under these circumstances, stating: 
“however careless the conduct or foreseeable the harm . . . [t]his 
                                                 
 190 Scott, supra note 7, at 470–71. 
 191 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 8, at 1580. 
 192 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 3 (AM. L. 
INST. 2020). 
 193 Jeffrey L. Goodman, Daniel R. Peacock & Kevin J. Rutan, A Guide to 
Understanding the Economic Loss Doctrine, 67 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 17–26 (2019) 
(describing the majority rule: “if the plaintiff suffers purely economic damages, 
the plaintiff’s only avenue of recovery is through contract”). 
 194 Id. 
 195 Johnson, supra note 63, at 547–48. 
 196 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750 N.E.2d 
1097 (N.Y. 2001). 
 197 Catherine M. Sharkey, Can Data Breach Claims Survive the Econ. Loss 
Rule?, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 339, 348–49 (2017). 
 198 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc., 750 N.E.2d at 1101–03. 
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restriction is necessary to avoid exposing defendants to unlimited 
liability to an indeterminate class of persons conceivably injured 
by any negligence in a defendant’s act.”199 But in no-contract 
scenarios, the rationale for the economic loss rule that emphasizes 
the primacy of the separate domains of contract and tort law is not 
applicable.200 Moreover, a minority of jurisdictions have shown a 
willingness to depart from the orthodoxy of the economic loss rule, 
particularly when a foreseeable, identifiable class of plaintiffs is 
available in lieu of unlimited liability.201  
Some courts have considered and rejected the invocation of 
SLADA for purely economic loss.202 For example, in Rosenblatt v. 
Exxon Co.,203 a tenant tried to sue the former owner of a tract of 
land whose actions resulted in toxic contamination of the land by 
gasoline for the economic losses resulting from failed business 
opportunities. The court found the relationship between the tenant 
and former landowner to be too attenuated.204  
Thus, these holdings and the requirement for a bounded set of 
plaintiffs suggest that a more substantial relationship between 
prospective plaintiffs and the platform provider defendant must be 
identified to recover economic losses, which courts have found 
through foreseeability.205 High-profile users of dangerous internet 
platforms will each map to different foreseeable sets of plaintiffs; 
anticipating the scope of a potential compromise might be a 
daunting task for platform providers, but seems a reasonable 
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 200 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 271 A.D.2d 
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burden to fall on the shoulders of the enterprise that stands to 
benefit most from the celebrity voice of its users.206 
Another route around the precedential wall erected by the 
economic loss doctrine, as suggested by Professor Citron in 2007, 
imagines reconceptualizing the nature of torts for the Information 
Age.207 In contrast to a self-worth defined by the ability to perform 
physical work with their bodies and property, Citron posits that 
“individuals [now] define themselves by their interactions and 
integrity in the marketplace” and that therefore “the law should 
adapt to account for injuries to our changed conception of 
personhood in the twenty-first century.”208 Such a 
reconceptualization would include economic damages related to, 
for example, the fallout from a data breach.209 
Since 2007, however, dangers posed by the internet have 
grown enough that a reconceptualization of the nature of potential 
tort damages is no longer necessary. Citron compares the metaphor 
relating reservoirs of data to Rylands’ reservoirs of water, but the 
metaphorical parallels between the two types of “reservoirs” are 
less important than the actual fact of extreme danger.210 The 
common law should include these extreme dangers among those 
considered abnormally dangerous.  
4. Tort Liability for Third-Party Criminals 
Without a statutory basis for liability, the starting point for 
building a case for any sort of common law liability consists in 
showing that the internet platform providers can be held liable for 
the actions of third-party criminals. The canonical case on-point is 
Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp.,211 where a duty 
to protect as between landlords and tenants was identified when the 
landlord had actual or constructive notice of a threat to the 
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tenants.212 Scholars have argued that this holding should be applied 
to the relationship between computer database operators and 
subjects of data breaches, whose identities could be compromised 
in the event of a breach.213  
Thus, a finding of liability against a compromised dangerous 
internet platform depends on the identification of a duty between 
the parties, a legal theory that exists only in nascent form in the 
realm of software security.214 However, since Kline, the DC Circuit 
has further refined the relationship required between parties and 
indicated that a legal duty might not always be required: “If the 
relationship . . . strongly suggests a duty of protection, then 
specific evidence of foreseeability is less important, whereas if the 
relationship is not of a type that entails a duty of protection, then 
the evidentiary hurdle is higher.”215 In other words, even without a 
legal duty, if the damage was highly foreseeable, a defendant can 
still be found liable for the actions of third parties.216 
Outside of the DC Circuit, some courts have eliminated the 
duty requirement in light of substantial foreseeability in the context 
of data security. In In re Arby’s Restaurant Group Inc. 
Litigation,217 a federal court applied Georgia law and found a 
common law duty where hackers stole the credit card data of 
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hundreds of thousands of consumers, holding that “allegations that 
a company knew of a foreseeable risk to its data security systems 
are sufficient to establish the existence of a plausible legal duty.”218 
As argued supra, compromises of dangerous internet platforms are 
not only foreseeable, they are inevitable.219 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There is a large chasm to cross before a court will agree to 
apply the doctrine of SLADA to dangerous internet platforms. 
Common law precedent holding the rule to apply only in the 
context of a narrowly defined subset of property damages, along 
with the longstanding economic loss rule, will require a court to 
make a bold step away from longstanding legal doctrines. But 
SLADA “is tort law’s conscience, an always-available alternative to 
the negligence system that persistently causes us to examine the 
justifications for the limitations on liability that are inherent in 
[existing tort law].”220 
The threat posed by certain internet platforms with global 
reach, used daily by governments and world leaders, was 
obviously not anticipated by the aggregated authors of those 
precedents. It is becoming progressively less controversial to argue 
that these internet platform providers should be exposed to liability 
in some form for consequences stemming from preventable 
compromises of their software security, especially given the 
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unjustifiable immunity usually found to exist under Section 230 of 
the Communications Decency Act.221 It is for jurists to decide what 
form that will take, unless and until Congress takes action. In the 
case of the most extreme dangers posed by these platforms, the 
analog to the dangers originally observed by the Rylands court are 
clear: such platforms must either assume liability for the 
consequences of compromises that are certain to occur, or else they 
must cease to exist in their current abnormally dangerous form. 
It took some twenty years after Rylands was decided in 
England before American courts adopted the doctrine.222 Even 
greater than the gradual forces of change associated with 
industrialization and economic growth, some commentators draw a 
direct line between particular massive disasters and the adoption of 
SLADA in the United States, notably the Johnstown Flood of 1889 
in Pennsylvania, in which the South Fork Dam in the outskirts of 
Pittsburgh burst and killed over 2,000 due to the negligence of 
wealthy country club owners.223 Perhaps we must wait until a 
cyber-Johnstown occurs; or perhaps it has already happened. 
 
  
                                                 
 221 See generally Citron & Wittes, supra note 68 (proposing a judicial 
overhaul of Section 230 jurisprudence based on reasonable precautions). 
 222 Citron, supra note 95, at 275; see also Jed H. Shugerman, The Floodgates 
of Strict Liability: Bursting Reservoirs and the Adoption of Fletcher v. Rylands 
in the Gilded Age, 110 YALE L.J. 333, 334–35 (2000). 
 223 Citron, supra note 95, at 275; Peter Smith, Johnstown Flood of 1889: Greatest 
Disaster in the State Continues to Resonate, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (May 24, 
2014, 11:57 PM), https://www.post-gazette.com/news/state/2014/05/25/Johnstown-
Flood-of-1889-continues-to-resonate/stories/201405250142 [https://perma.cc/3F59-
YZRN] (“A jury of Pennsylvania Lutherans, Reformed Dutch, Presbyterians, 
Methodists, Baptists or Catholics will not take readily to the attempt to cast the 
responsibility of such a catastrophe from the shoulders of the fine rich 
gentlemen who owned the fish pond and the rotten dam to the shoulders of 
God.”) (quoting The Law of Bursting Reservoirs, 23 AM. L. REV. 643, 647 
(1889)). 
334 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 22: 2 
 
 
